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In Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres [2018] UKSC 24, the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court found that an informal oral variation of a contract 
that featured a “no oral variation” clause was not enforceable, overturning a Court of 
Appeal finding that it was the “no oral variation” clause that had no force (MWB v 
Rock Advertising [2016] EWCA Civ 553). This resolved an ongoing lack of clarity in 
English law, with previous Court of Appeal decisions suggesting that “no oral 
variation” clauses could (United Bank v Asif, CA, 11 February 2000, unreported) and 
could not (World Online Telecom v I-Way [2002] EWCA Civ 413, Globe Motors v 
TRW [2016]) be enforced. The facts of Rock Advertising provide a useful illustration 
of how “no oral variation” issues can arise, so we will start there, before examining 
the arguments for and against enforceability made in the case, and finally 
commenting on what the case means for the position in New Zealand. 
 
ROCK ADVERTISING V MWB: THE DISPUTE 
 
In 2011, Rock leased an office from MWB, a commercial office manager. Cl 7.6 of 
the lease, which included a “no oral variation” clause (which we have italicised), 
stated: 
 
This Licence sets out all of the terms as agreed between MWB and Licensee. 
No other representations or terms shall apply or form part of this Licence. All 
variations to this Licence must be agreed, set out in writing and signed on 
behalf of both parties before they take effect. 
 
Rock’s business did not develop as it anticipated, and by February 2012 it was in 
rent arrears by around £12,000. The company’s sole director Mr Idehen proposed a 
deferred schedule of payments to Ms Evans, a credit controller employed by MWB. A 
telephone conversation about the proposal took place on 27 February, during which, 
Rock claimed and MWB denied, the parties entered into an oral agreement to vary 
the terms of the lease. That day, Rock made a payment in accordance with its new 
schedule of payments.  
 
On 30 March 2012, MWB locked Rock out of the premises and gave notice of 
termination, which the lease entitled MWB to do if Rock was in arrears. However, if 
the contract had been varied in accordance with Rock’s revised schedule of 
payments, then Rock was not in arrears. Thus, the question of whether the contract 
had been varied was crucial for whether MWB’s lockout and termination were a 
lawful response to Rock’s breach of its obligation to pay rent, or were actually a 
serious breach of MWB’s obligations to Rock. 
 
Rock succeeded in establishing that an oral agreement had occurred at first 
instance, and the appellate courts did not disturb that initial finding. Accordingly, 
argument focused on whether the oral variation was enforceable in light of the “no 
oral variation” clause. 
 
MWB also argued that the agreement was not enforceable because it lacked 
consideration. In addition, Rock argued that, even if there was no enforceable 
contract variation, MWB was estopped from going back on the variation. Here, our 
focus is on the arguments concerning no oral variation clauses. In any case, the 
argument that MWB received no consideration from the variation arguably fails 
because the ‘practical benefit’ test for consideration in Williams v Roffey Bros and 
Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1989] EWCA Civ 5 applies: MWB would have received a 
practical benefit by receiving rent payments, albeit later than initially agreed, as 
opposed to risking receiving no rent until a new tenant could be found. In addition, 
Foakes v Beer [1884] UKHL 1 (an agreement to pay less lacks consideration), 
arguably does not strictly apply because this was a case of paying later, not paying 
less (although Lord Sumption in Rock v MWB hinted at [18] that Foakes v Beer was 
“ripe for re-examination” and stated that the points of distinction are forced). 
Furthermore, Rock’s estoppel claim fails because they did not suffer any detriment in 
making a payment in accordance with the revised schedule, because they were 
already obliged to pay at least that sum to MWB. 
 
NO ORAL VARIATION CLAUSES: ARGUMENTS AGAINST ENFORCEABILITY 
 
Proponents of the non-enforceability position typically appeal to party autonomy, as 
was the case of the Court of Appeal in MWB v Rock (at [31] and [34]). A forceful 
example is Moore-Bick LJ’s statement in Globe Motors at [119] that: 
 
The governing principle, in my view, is that of party autonomy. The principle 
of freedom of contract entitles parties to agree whatever terms they choose, 
subject to certain limits imposed by public policy…The parties are therefore 
free to include terms regulating the manner in which the contract can be 
varied, but just as they can create obligations at will, so also can they 
discharge or vary them, at any rate where to do so would not affect the rights 
of third parties. If there is an analogy with the position of Parliament, it is in 
the principle that Parliament cannot bind its successors. 
 
There are two distinct arguments relating to party autonomy evident in this passage. 
The first is that making “no oral variation” clauses unenforceable respects the parties’ 
autonomy because it gives effect to their autonomously chosen oral agreement. The 
second is that, because parties have the autonomy to shape their obligations, it is 
simply not possible to prevent them from agreeing to depart from an earlier 
agreement. As Cardozo J put it in Alfred C Beatty v Guggenheim Exploration 
Company and others (1919) 225 NY 380 at 387-388: 
 
Those who make a contract, may unmake it. The clause which forbids a 
change, may be changed like any other. The prohibition of oral waiver, may 
itself be waived ... What is excluded by one act, is restored by another. You 
may put it out by the door, it is back through the window. Whenever two men 
contract, no limitation self-imposed can destroy their power to contract 
again... 
 
NO ORAL VARIATION CLAUSES: ARGUMENTS FOR ENFORCEABILITY 
 
The Supreme Court was unanimous in finding that both (1) “no oral variation clauses” 
could be enforceable, and (2) the “no oral variation” clause in the lease was 
enforceable and meant that the oral agreement was not effective. Lord Sumption, 
with whom Lady Hale, Lord Wilson and Lord Lloyd-Jones agreed, delivered a 
majority opinion. Lord Briggs gave a separate judgment to explain why he reached 
the same result on different conceptual grounds. 
 
Lord Sumption’s judgment squarely addresses the appeal to party autonomy and the 
impossibility argument raised by proponents of non-enforceability of “no oral 
variation” clauses. He also gives several additional arguments in favour of 
enforceability: that there can be legitimate commercial reasons for business people 
to want such clauses in their contracts, and that entire agreement clauses, which he 
argued “no oral variation” clauses are analogous to, are now routinely applied. 
Finally, he addressed the argument that an oral variation must be supposed to 
amount to a contractual agreement to dispense with the requirement that variations 
be in writing. 
 
Lord Sumption took the appeal to party autonomy made by opponents of the 
enforceability of “no oral variation” clauses head on at [11], suggesting that failing to 
enforce “no oral variation” clauses was the real threat to party autonomy because it 
does not give effect to the parties’ autonomosly chosen agreement that variations 
must be in writing. He observed that party autonomy applies prior to contract 
formation, but the creation of a contract nearly always limits the parties’ autonomy. 
He also noted that there are many cases where statutes prescribe that agreement 
must be in a particular form to be effective, with the requirement that contracts for the 
sale of land be in writing being a notable example, and said that there is no reason in 
principle why parties should not be able to agree to that same restriction.  
 
Lord Sumption characterised the impossibility argument as a conceptual one at [13]: 
“it is conceptually impossible for the parties to agree not to vary their contract by 
word of mouth because any such agreement would automatically be destroyed upon 
their doing so.” However, he argued, if it was really conceptually impossible for a 
legal system to (i) allow parties to enter into oral contracts but also (ii) allow parties to 
agree to limit their ability to orally modify written contracts, then we would expect that 
no legal system would do so, short of some kind of overriding legislative intervention. 
However, Lord Sumption points out, that is not the case: both the Vienna Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) and UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts, 4th ed (2016) can give effect to oral variation 
clauses. So, Lord Sumption concluded, the impossibility argument does not bear 
scrutiny. 
 
As Lord Sumption noted at [7], the common law takes a flexible approach to the 
validity of simple contracts in that oral agreements can be enforceable. He went on to 
say at [12] that this flexibility has benefits for businesspeople as they can enter 
agreements quickly, informally, and without needing lawyers or formally drafted 
documents. However, he suggested, there are legitimate (in the sense that they are 
not contrary to law or policy) reasons that commercial people might see that flexibility 
as a mixed blessing and seek to contract out of it via a “no oral variation” clause. The 
first is that it prevents potentially underhanded attempts to undermine written 
agreements which parties might raise, for example, in attempt to stave off a dispute 
being decided against them at summary judgment. The second is to avoid the messy 
disputes that can arise about the existence and content of oral discussions. The third 
is to police internal rules restricting authority to vary contracts. 
 
Lord Sumption also noted that “entire agreement” clauses (of which the non-italicised 
part of cl 7.6 is an example) are now routinely applied by English courts (see [14]). 
“Entire agreement” clauses seek to lock the terms of a written contract down to those 
expressed in the document, and prevent parties from identifying pre-contractual 
representations or statements and arguing that those are part of, or affect, the 
agreement. Lord Sumption argued that both “entire agreement” and “no oral 
variation” clauses serve the same purpose: to achieve certainty about the parties’ 
contractual obligations, and there was no sensible reason to enforce one and not the 
other.  
 
Finally, Lord Sumption addressed the argument that parties that enter into an oral 
variation to change the terms of a contract that includes a “no oral variation” clause 
must be treated as having intended to agree to dispense with the clause. His 
response at [15] was that: 
 
What the parties to such a clause have agreed is not that oral variations are 
forbidden, but that they will be invalid. The mere fact of agreeing to an oral 
variation is not therefore a contravention of the clause. It is simply the 
situation to which the clause applies. It is not difficult to record a variation in 
writing, except perhaps in cases where the variation is so complex that no 
sensible businessman would do anything else. The natural inference from the 
parties’ failure to observe the formal requirements of a No Oral Modification 
clause is not that they intended to dispense with it but that they overlooked it. 
If, on the other hand, they had it in mind, then they were courting invalidity 
with their eyes open. 
 
Lord Briggs took a slightly different approach. He agreed with Lord Sumption that 
there was a conceptual barrier to the enforcement of “no oral variation” clauses, but 
disagreed that the barrier could be overcome. Unlike Lord Sumption, Lord Briggs 
accepted the impossibility argument. He stated at [25] that, if parties enter into a 
written contract with a “no oral variation” clause, the clause is enforceable as long as 
either party insists upon it but, if both parties agree to do away with it (which they can 
do orally) then the presence of the clause cannot defeat that agreement: “[t]hat fully 
reflects the autonomy of parties to bind themselves as to their future conduct, while 
preserving their autonomy to agree to release themselves from that inhibition.”  
 
Lord Briggs rejected at [28] Lord Sumption’s analogy with “entire agreement” clauses 
on the basis that, while both types of clauses aim to promote certainty only “no oral 
variation” clauses pose a problem for party autonomy and thus require different 
treatment. 
 
Arguably, “entire agreement” clauses give effect to the will of the parties to reconcile 
and reduce all past negotiations into a document that reflects the entirety of their 
agreement. They do not override previous acts of contracting. Rather, they exercise 
control over which pre-contractual representations have contractual force. In 
contrast, “no oral variation clauses” purport to override future acts of will by the 
parties, could be said to threaten party autonomy. 
 
Where Lord Briggs wholeheartedly agreed with Lord Sumption was that the mere 
existence of an oral agreement that would vary the terms of a written contract that 
features a “no oral variation” clause should not be treated as impliedly amounting to 
an agreement to dispense with that clause (see [29]). For Lord Briggs, the conclusion 
that the parties intended to abandon their agreement only to vary the contract in 
writing should only be reached where the parties actually contemplated doing so, or 




Two pre-Rock v MWB decisions of the New Zealand Court of Appeal suggest that, as 
a matter of the current law, “no oral variation” clauses can be enforced in New 
Zealand. In Air NZ v Nippon Credit Bank [1997] 1 NZLR 218 (CA), the Court of 
Appeal dismissed an argument for oral variation at 227, stating that, even if the oral 
statements in question had been made, the lease in question expressly provided that 
all variations must be in writing and signed by one of the parties. In Stevens v ASB 
Bank [2012] NZCA 611 the Court of Appeal noted this earlier dismissal in Air NZ v 
Nippon Credit Bank of an oral variation argument in the face of a “no oral variation” 
clause, and stated at [27] that: 
 
If the parties had intended to bind themselves to some new arrangement, we 
have no doubt that ASB would have documented that appropriately. In the 
absence of such documentation, we see no justification for going behind 
these plainly worded provisions, which are intended to prevent the uncertainty 
and dispute that so often arises where written agreements are said to have 
been varied orally. 
 
The most recent case to touch on the issue, is Beneficial Finance v Brown [2017] 
NZHC 964, a dismissal for an application for summary judgment, also focuses on the 
parties’ intentions, stating at [77] that: “whether an oral variation becomes operative 
turns on the intention of the parties. The burden of proof rests on the party alleging 
the variation.” That is consistent with the most recent edition of Law of Contract in 
New Zealand (Burrows, Finn and Todd (eds), 6th edition, LexisNexis, Wellington, 
2018), which is broadly supportive of the conceptual impossibility argument in its 
discussion of “no oral variation” clauses at 773. 
 
However, Rock Advertising v MWB casts a long shadow over the dialogue about “no 
oral variation” clauses, and it likely to come up the next time an oral variation issue 
arises in New Zealand. The focus on the parties’ intentions in the New Zealand 
cases aligns more closely with Lord Briggs’s approach in Rock Advertising v MWB 
than Lord Sumption’s, although the New Zealand cases do not clearly require an 
intention to dispense with the “no oral variation” clause as opposed to a more general 
intention to vary. Lord Briggs’s position could be preferred in New Zealand as a kind 
of pragmatic halfway house between the more extreme positions taken by Lord 
Sumption and his opponents. 
 
That said, it is possible that, when the question of the enforceability of “no oral 
variation” clauses comes before the New Zealand courts, Lord Sumption’s approach 
is preferred, given that it attracted the support of four of the five judges in the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court. While it is clear that there is a conceptual difference of 
view, it less clear what factual scenario might produce a different result depending on 
whether Lord Sumption’s or Lord Briggs’s approach is adopted.  
 
Thus, the most important point to come out of Rock Advertising v MWB is that “no 
oral variation” clauses can be enforced, contrary to the line of English cases 
suggesting otherwise, and that is likely to remain the case in New Zealand. The 
strongest argument for not enforcing a “no oral variation” clause would come in a 
case where the parties specifically turned their minds to the presence of such a 
clause and agreed orally that they would dispense with it. We shall have to see 
whether such facts arise, in which case the conceptual difference between Lord 
Sumption and Lord Briggs may become more than academic. 
